n recent years, pension coverage in the private sector has been shifting from defined-benefit (DB) plans to defined-contribution (DC) plans. Some employers have closed their DB pension plans to new hires ("close") or frozen the plan's benefit accrual for some or all existing plan participants ("freeze"). Most of these companies have simultaneously enhanced their 401(k) plans. The commonly cited motivations for such changes include cost and volatility reduction, consistency with industry-competitive practice, and employee desires and satisfaction. Many have wondered whether and to what extent a DB freeze/close alters the market value of the corporate plan sponsor.
This empirical analysis tests the hypothesis that freezing or closing DB pension plans increases the sponsoring companies' market values. The premise for this hypothesis is that DB plan freezes/closes depress the growth of pension liabilities and thus allow more funds to be directed to profit-generating corporate businesses or to other forms of compensation that are less risky or less costly to the company.
Our study contributes to the literature in two ways: First, we constructed a large database comprising 82 publicly traded U.S. companies for [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] in various sectors. Identified simply by the availability of specific freeze/close announcement dates, these companies can be considered random draws and are thus fairly representative of the population of corporations that have frozen or closed their DB plans. Second, on the basis of this extensive sample and through a set of parametric and nonparametric tests under the event study methodology, our analysis provides general and robust evidence on the tested hypothesis.
The event study methodology has been used extensively in the financial economics literature. For example, it was applied by MacKinlay (1997) to examine the effect of the disclosure of quarterly earnings on stock prices and by Mitchell and Netter (1994) to assess the effect of securities fraud on a company's value. But the literature on the impact of a DB plan freeze/close on company value is still developing. Rubin (2007) found an insignificant impact in the first 50 postannouncement days but found an increase in the underlying company value of almost 10 percent over the next 50 days. This unusually long delay in stock price change was observed in a small sample of 14 companies. Although Milevsky and Song (2008) found a positive impact of a DB freeze on company value (about 3.8 percent), it was statistically insignificant from zero. They conjectured that the increase in value could be attributable primarily to the mitigation of the pension longevity risk exposure and not necessarily to the reduction of contribution costs.
For our event study and empirical tests, we made the usual market efficiency assumption: New information, including the announcement of a DB plan freeze/close, is reflected immediately in a company's stock price. The literature is rich in research that has tested this assumption. In the context of pensions, Feldstein and Morck (1983) , Bulow, Morck, and Summers (1987) , and others Worldwide, Arlington, Virginia. Note: The views expressed in this article are the authors' alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of Watson Wyatt Worldwide.
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Financial Analysts Journal provided empirical evidence that the market valuation of companies effectively takes into account pension funding levels. Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) further verified the informational efficiency in the capital market by showing that, besides the value of a pension surplus or deficit, pension plan risk is closely reflected in company equity risk. Coronado, Mitchell, Sharpe, and Nesbitt (2008) , however, found that investors pay more attention to the face values in the financial statements and less attention to the more pertinent footnotes regarding pension assets and liabilities. Their finding seems to indicate biased measurement. Our focus, however, is on the first-order impact of dramatic freeze/close events as compared with the nuances of measurement.
Theoretical Impact of DB Plan Freeze
Standard financial theory postulates that the value of a company can be expressed as the sum of its future cash flows adjusted for time lapse. In the event of a DB plan freeze/close, the change in company value is expected to be the present value of future gains or losses from the event. In addition to these direct monetary changes, one needs to take into account the changes in corporate risk profiles, as well as the signaling effect of a freeze/close announcement.
Impact of Funding Costs.
In general, companies that freeze or close their DB plans expect to save contribution costs to those plans and to reduce volatility. Most sponsors, however, simultaneously enhance their contributions or corporate match to their DC plans because they may wish to ease the transition for employees or maintain similar levels of benefits. This cost comparison does not directly take into account the cost efficiency in collective investing, which likely implies lower true contribution costs for DB plans. 1 In the near term, the contribution costs saved by freezing/closing DB plans may or may not be offset by the increases in contributions to DC plans. The difference in contribution costs may grow bigger in the more distant years. Depending on the forward-looking horizon and judged likelihood of realizing the gains (losses), the market may discount future gains (losses) more heavily given the gradual nature of the impact of a DB plan freeze/close. 2 Impact of Corporate Risk Profiles. Arguably, DB plan freezes/closes can help reduce the volatility of pension liabilities by gradually moving investment and longevity risks off the corporate balance sheet. The risk reduction in the DB plan, therefore, contributes to the company's value. This consideration has been cited by many companies to justify their DB freezes/closes. As responsibilities are transferred to employees, however, one cannot entirely rule out the possibility that DC plan sponsors could end up shouldering some unexpected risks in DC plans (e.g., the need for investment guarantees or supplements), although such risks would seem to be low under current practices and regulations. 3 Alternatively, companies could be pressured to increase wages to compensate for the risk in DC investments.
Employers will likely face additional challenges regarding workforce management. Employees' increasing dependence on DC plans could make their retirements susceptible to the influence of market booms and busts, and the declining DB coverage could add financial insecurity to their retirements. Workers' timing of retirement could be at odds with the sponsors' needs for human capital over the business cycle and the desire for an orderly workforce exit. That is, financial readiness for retirement could be jeopardized, which, in turn, could lead to the "hidden pensioner" problem: Unproductive workers might choose to postpone retirement and thus end up costing employers more than is warranted. The shift from DB to DC plans could also negatively affect employee morale (a decrease in confidence in the company), which could pose a challenge to both productivity and the ability to attract talent.
In general, the volatility reduction in DB planfunding costs via freezes/closes might or might not be outweighed by the newly introduced risks or uncertainties in DC plans and human resources management.
Impact of Market Perception. Because a single-employer DB plan is an integral part of the corporate business, its accrual and funding policies are often reflective of the sponsoring company's financial health. In some cases, DB freeze/close announcements are combined with companies' statements of disappointing financial outcomes. Some companies invoke DB freezes/closes as a measure to curtail costs in order to revive their competitive standing. The efficacy of such actions remains an open question. The decision to freeze/ close a DB plan is perhaps by itself a negative signal of the company's prospects.
In short, summing up these factors does not make it clear a priori whether a DB plan freeze/close will lead to a significant stock market effect. Absent company-specific details, to conjecture a positive or negative impact of a DB freeze/close is a challenge. Therefore, we decided that letting the market tell the story was a more feasible and efficient way to approach the issue. We used the event study methodology to empirically test how the equity price, a close proxy for company value, reacts to the announcement of a DB plan freeze/close.
Methodologies for Testing the Impact of a Pension Plan Freeze/Close
The event study methodology rests on the usual assumption of the rationality and efficiency of stock markets-namely, that the impact of public information should be reflected immediately in traded companies' security prices. We conducted our study on security prices to determine whether unusual price movements, termed "abnormal returns," are observed following various events. The standard procedure for an event study consists of two major steps: breaking stock returns into normal and abnormal components and testing the statistical significance of the latter. Markedly positive (negative) abnormal returns indicate a favorable (unfavorable) reading of the announcement by the market. 4
Estimating Abnormal Returns Associated with a Freeze/Close. Abnormal returns over the period of interest, the "event window," are derived by subtracting normal returns from total stock returns. Normal returns are defined as the expected returns absent an event and are predicted by a broad market portfolio based on the econometric relationship estimated over a reasonably long "estimation window." Compared with this most commonly used "market model," other models generally add little explanatory power and are often meant to deal with some special data situations (MacKinlay 1997) . The event window is denoted [T 1 + 1, . . . 0, . . . T 2 ] and customarily includes a few days surrounding the announcement date, t = 0; the estimation window is denoted (T 0 , T 1 ) and typically does not overlap with the event window to avoid unduly subsuming any event impact into normal returns.
Testing for Statistical Significance of Abnormal Returns. We conducted three tests to verify whether abnormal returns, positive or negative, are statistically significant. These alternative tests tackle the issue from different angles and serve as crosschecks of robustness. The test statistics asymptotically follow an N(0,1) distribution under the null hypothesis, H 0 , which is that the freeze/close event has no impact on the behavior of stock prices (i.e., abnormal returns are expected to be zero).
Test 1 determines whether abnormal returns, security by security, are statistically different from zero. The test statistic is the average abnormal return over the event window normalized by its standard deviation (separately for each individual stock). This disaggregated security-by-security analysis is robust to co-movements between security prices (clustering events).
Test 2 tests the null hypothesis that abnormal returns for all stocks in the whole sample are zero. The test statistic is calculated as the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) across securities and over the event window and is normalized by its standard deviation. Thus, this test focuses on the "average effect." When the data sample is sufficiently large and the freeze/close announcements are not clustered, this aggregate analysis will yield general evidence (or dismissal) of abnormal returns.
Finally, Test 3 is a nonparametric sign test. Its basis is that, under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) has a 50-50 chance of being positive or negative. Test 3 is not used in isolation but is included to check the robustness of conclusions drawn from standard parametric tests. Thus, this test pays particular attention to the "median effect."
The Data: Which Companies Froze/Closed Their DB Plans
We compiled a list of companies that announced during the 2003-07 period that they would freeze their pension benefit accruals to existing employees or would close their DB plans to new hires. The elapsed time from the announcement to the effective date of the plan change varied from several days to more than three years. With no a priori data selection criteria, we identified the announcement dates of DB plan freezes/closes from companies' press releases, U.S. SEC filings, and media coverage. Many more DB plan freezes/closes occurred in recent years than we used in our analysis, but no reliable, consistent source of information exists to help identify those announcement dates (if any), which are critical to an event study. Nonetheless, our data collection generated a large sample consisting of 82 U.S. public companies listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or Amex. 5 The sample has 4, 10, 8, 43, and 17 events for years 2003 , respectively. Watson Wyatt Worldwide (2007 
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Financial Analysts Journal of our sample companies are currently among the Fortune 1000. Because we did not impose selection restrictions, however, our sample covers a wider range of companies, with considerable variations in net sales, capitalization, workforce size, and pension assets and liabilities. Table 1 reports the characteristics of companies and their frozen/closed DB plans. These statistics are for the same fiscal year as the DB freeze/close if it was announced in the last quarter of the fiscal year; otherwise, the statistics are for the prior fiscal year if the announcement was made before the last quarter. Some companies are small to medium in size, and many others are large. Companies' profitability varied from negative returns on assets to strong positive returns. Some pension plans were poorly funded before the freeze/close; others were more than fully funded. Table 2 reports the sector distributions of these companies according to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). The relative sector concentrations of freezes/closes is worth noting: Companies seem to be more (less) likely to freeze/ close their DB pension plans if their economic sectors are more (less) sensitive to business cycles. For instance, the GICS sector "consumer discretionary" has 17 freezes/closes versus only 3 in "consumer staples." This pattern is largely consistent with the notion that companies may want to fend off the transmission or addition of pension risks to their core business. Employers often cite reduction of volatility in pension costs as one of the main motivations for closing, freezing, or even terminating their DB pension plans (Watson Wyatt Worldwide 2008a).
In many cases, the DB plan freeze/close announcements were the only issue covered by press releases or media, as in examples 1 and 2 that follow. In some cases, the announcements were combined with other restructuring plans, as in example 3. Determining the number of employees affected was difficult because such information was rarely available. Many companies sponsored separate plans for unionized and salaried employees or had many different plans as a result of prior mergers and acquisitions. A sponsor might freeze or close one DB plan while keeping another one active. We examined this complexity by controlling for such company characteristics as sales and employee size. Another issue is how unexpected the announcement To better understand the financial situations of these freezing/closing companies, we further matched each company with two industry peers. We selected the peers on the basis of the following criteria: whether they were in the same GICS industry, had DB pension plans but had not frozen/ closed them, and had sales volume five years before the event immediately above or below the sales of the company adopting a freeze/close. When the company in our sample was the largest in its industry, the next largest companies were selected. We ended up with 50 events and 100 comparison companies in our sample. Table 3 provides a comparison of the basic characteristics of the companies that adopted a DB plan freeze/close with those of their industry peers. It reports median values of net sales, total assets, and employee sizes of the companies for the five years leading up to the event. The table shows that the control group is similar to our event sample in terms of sales volume. An interesting characteristic is that the companies that closed or froze their DB plans tended to have smaller company asset values but had almost a third more employees than their industry peers. This larger workforce could translate into higher pension costs for companies that froze/closed their DB plans compared with the control group companies that maintained their pensions. Table 4 provides a comparison of median profitability and productivity values of companies that froze/closed their DB plans with those of industry peers that maintained their plans. It shows that both the control and event groups had positive changes in profitability and productivity over the five years leading up to the event. Companies that elected to maintain their DB plans, however, performed better than those that froze/closed their plans. Specifically, market value, shareholders' equity, and net sales per employee increased by 52 percent, 38 percent, and 39 percent, respectively, for the control group; the corresponding numbers are 31 percent, 9.5 percent, and 26 percent for the event group. The more direct measure for profitability-cash flow from operating activities/net sales-indicates that the companies in the control group had a higher percentage, on average, over the five-year span by approximately 1.5 percentage points on an annual basis. A shorter-horizon comparison-median values over the last two years leading up to the event-reveals largely similar positioning of the freezing/closing companies in their industries: They had smaller growth in productivity (net sales per employee) and negative growth in shareholders' equity, whereas the control group maintained significant growth in shareholders' equity.
That companies have been freezing/closing their DB plans because of poor financial performance, not necessarily in the DB plan but in the company itself, is a prevalent notion. Although these basic financial characteristics are insufficient to test or verify such causality, they may suggest that some of the plan changes were related to poor short-term financial performance. Another possibility is that, although all companies had positive financial results over the previous five years, freezing/closing companies were underperforming their competitors and were looking for ways to match their competitors' financial results. Some employers may have thought that one way to achieve this goal was to cut their pension plans.
This analysis does not directly identify the reasons behind DB plan freezes/closes. The literature, however, offers useful clues. In a survey of Fortune 1000 companies, Watson Wyatt Worldwide (2008a) found that cost and volatility containments were among the main reasons cited by employers for DB plan freezes/closes, whereas many other companies made a formal decision to stay committed to their DB plans because of the plans' efficiency in terms of human resources management. Munnell, Golub-Sass, Soto, and Vitagliano (2006) examined a small sample of healthy companies and conjectured the following reasons for freezing DB plans: global competition, crowding out by rising health care costs, high DB plan risks associated with the market, longevity and regulation, and the diminishing importance of DB plans to upper management compensation. Munnell and Soto (2007) empirically tested the relationship between the probability of a DB plan freeze and the characteristics of the plans, the sponsors, and their industries. They found, among other factors, that the probability of freezing a DB plan tends to be higher if the plan has a large potential for damaging the company financially (e.g., a high credit balance with limited use under the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and/or a substantial pension legacy cost), is relatively easy to freeze/close (e.g., a noncollectively bargained plan or a small number of employees being affected by the plan changes), and/or is operated by a sponsor that faces a pressing industry trend (e.g., global competition pressures and/ or industry moves toward DC plans).
Empirical Findings: The Impact of a DB Plan Freeze/Close on Stock Prices
We considered four event windows: (T 1 + 1, T 2 ) = (-1, +1), (-3, +3), (-19, +3) , and (-19, +20), with announcement date t = 0. A few trading days surrounding a DB freeze/close announcement are generally sufficient to capture market reactions. Adding more days (particularly postannouncement days) to the event window risks including irrelevant information that is actually attributable to other developments. We nonetheless report results for the relatively long event windows for the purpose of a robustness check. Main findings should perhaps be based on the event window of (-3, +3) or (-19, +3) . The (T 0 , T 1 ) estimation windows are 170-190 trading days prior to these events. This length of time follows the convention of event studies and should be sufficient to yield reliable estimates for normal returns. The returns of individual stocks and market portfolios are based on trading-day closing prices adjusted for splits and dividends.
Benchmark Tests with the S&P 500 Index as the Market Portfolio. As previously discussed, the null hypothesis in all the tests is that the announcement of a DB plan freeze/close has no statistically significant impact on security prices (i.e., no higherthan-normal returns). Significance (insignificance) of the test statistics would reject (fail to reject) this hypothesis and would imply that such an impact probably exists (is unlikely to exist).
In the benchmark set of tests, the market portfolio is first approximated by the S&P 500, which is matched to security prices by the trading days. In Test 1, when the freeze/close announcements are
©2009 CFA Institute
Financial Analysts Journal examined security by security over the window of (-19, +3) , 4 out of the 82 events exhibit positive returns in their stock prices at a statistical significance level of 0.10. At the same time, however, seven companies have statistically significant but negative returns surrounding the events. Thus, this test gives a mixed message about the impact of DB plan changes. Figure 1 shows that the majority of events settle in the statistically insignificant range.
In Test 2, when securities are considered jointly as a group, empirical evidence shows that the pension freeze/close events fail to increase the sponsoring companies' values. As reported in Table 5 (panel A, "mean value"), the statistics are generally insignificant and often negative. The negative significance over the long (-19, +20) window (which may unduly subsume other new company developments) even seems to suggest a detrimental effect. Figure 2 plots the cumulative average abnormal returns among securities in the event window. It reveals that the average return on these securities declines both before and after the freeze/ close announcements.
These findings are confirmed in the nonparametric Test 3 (panel A of Table 5 , "median value"), which serves as a robustness check and complements Tests 1 and 2. This sign test indicates a roughly even (50-50) chance that securities among the freeze/close events would experience higheror lower-than-normal returns. The numbers of positive and negative cumulative abnormal returns are largely equal. 
Does Freezing a Defined-Benefit Pension Plan Increase Company Value? Empirical Evidence
No notable difference exists among the industries. Specifically, Test 1 found statistically significant events mainly in the industrial, consumer discretionary, and financial sectors. Factoring in the number of freeze/close events for each sector, however, shows no disproportionate concentration of significant events in any particular sector. Test 3 verifies that positive and negative signs are approximately evenly distributed in these sectors. A simple regression of the abnormal returns (Test 1 statistics) on industry dummies reveals no statistically significant correlations.
We also used S&P 500 sector indices as market portfolios to estimate normal returns because price movements of sectors may substantially deviate from the aggregate market. The use of a composite index as a market portfolio may misclassify some sector-specific trends or normal returns into the abnormal component. For example, the S&P 500 Information Technology (45) soared in the late 1990s, whereas the S&P 500 Energy (10) recently (before the market crash of fall 2008) followed a skyrocket trajectory, far exceeding the trend of the S&P 500. We used the 10 GICS sector indices, which are calculated on a large number of securities and are thus unlikely to be skewed by a single company. In capital market research, the GICS is significantly better than other classification schemes in explaining stock movements (Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler 2003) .
The results are shown in panel B of Table 5 . Compared with earlier results in which the S&P 500 was used, the test statistics change slightly but remain insignificant in most tests. The key finding here is that after correcting for potential bias associated with the use of a composite index, the empirical evidence is against the prospects of positive abnormal returns or increased company values from DB plan freezes/closes.
Factors Associated with Market Reactions.
We next examined what factors might help explain the market price reactions following the DB freeze/ close announcements. We ran ordinary leastsquares (OLS) regressions of Test 1 statistics (e.g., abnormal returns normalized by standard deviations) on a variety of company and plan variables. These variables reflect • company size (net sales), • company profitability (return on assets), • employee productivity (net sales per employee), • DB plan funded status (ratio of plan assets to liabilities), • plan-funding risk (liabilities minus assets as a percentage of company market value), • plan size (ratio of plan assets to company assets or, alternatively, ratio of plan liabilities to company market value), • annual plan financing burden (six alternative ratios: plan expenses to net sales, plan service costs to net sales, plan contributions to net sales, plan contributions to plan service costs, plan contributions to cash flows, and plan contributions to operating income), • dummies for GICS sectors, • year dummies, and • a dummy for "freeze" ("close" is discussed later in the article). ©2009 CFA Institute
Financial Analysts Journal
To avoid the econometric simultaneity problem, we collected all these variables for the fiscal year immediately before the DB freeze/close or for the same fiscal year if the announcement occurred in the final fiscal quarter. The adjusted R 2 s in the regressions range from 0.22 to 0.37, which suggests a reasonable goodness-of-fit of the specifications. 6 We found three variables to be statistically significant: company size, plan-funding risk, and the "freeze" dummy (all of which have negative signs at the 0.01 or 0.05 significance level). The pension plans' funded status appears to have no statistically significant relationship with the stock price movements. Occasionally, higher pension plan expenses (relative to net sales) are associated with lower stock prices (at the 0.10 significance level) when a DB plan freeze/close is announced. Companies' profitability, employee productivity, and sector locations are also statistically irrelevant.
These results are somewhat surprising and deserve further study. As a conjecture, untested here, we submit that both the negative coefficients on company size and plan-funding risk seem to suggest a "signaling" interpretation. That is, larger companies' decisions to freeze/close their DB plans, which usually invite media attention, might induce investors to question the financial health of the whole corporate entities beyond the pension plans. If large relative to a company's financial capacity, the pension funding risk might hint that other corporate businesses are also shaky. DB plan freezes/closes might trigger investors' unease about the companies, and that unease might dominate the prospect of potential reductions in pension cost and volatility (if they exist), for which the market might cheer. Sensitivity Tests. For sensitivity tests, we used alternative market portfolios, separated DB plan freezes from closes, extended the time period of the event window, and divided the sample into pre-2006 and post-2005 time periods.
We started the event study by breaking stock returns into normal and abnormal components. The decomposition varied with the choice of market portfolio in the estimation for normal returns. In the sensitivity tests, we first used the broader Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Composite Index and the Russell 3000 Index to reflect the aggregate performance of all or most of the publicly traded U.S. stocks. We then used narrower, more exchangespecific NYSE, NASDAQ, and Amex composite indices for the companies listed on those stock exchanges. Companies' selection of exchange might reflect their characteristics, management styles, and broad preferences in the first place. The results of these alternative tests are similar to those of the benchmark tests: We found no systematic empirical evidence for positive abnormal returns associated with DB plan freezes/closes.
As observed in press releases, SEC filings, and media coverage, DB plan freezes/closes vary from case to case. Some companies close their DB plans to new hires; others freeze the benefit accrual to some or all existing employees. These partial and hard freezes may yield different financial implications for plan sponsors. We separated closes from freezes and conducted the tests accordingly. We used the S&P 500 as the market portfolio, and the results were insensitive to alternative market indices.
Consisting of 72 events, the freeze category closely mimics the sector distribution when freezes and closes are considered together. The test results shown in panel A of Table 6 echo the results of the benchmark tests in Table 5 and suggest generally negative abnormal returns.
In contrast, as reported in panel B of Table 6 , a close has a significant and positive impact on the sponsor's corporate value. This finding is somewhat surprising because a close affects new employees only and should generate a weaker financial impact compared with the more radical freeze. But perhaps, compared with a freeze, a close may be viewed as a relatively more positive change in that the morale and productivity of existing employees are largely unaffected.
Several points, however, suggest that caution be used in interpreting these results. First, the small close sample (only 10 companies) is not necessarily (-19, +20) 9.14*** 4.40** 9 *Significant at the 10 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
representative of the corporate universe. A larger close sample with accurate announcement dates is needed before any message can be generalized. Unfortunately, data availability is a major constraint. Second, a single security can strongly influence the aggregate tests in such a small sample. Specifically, although most of the securities exhibited positive CARs, only two of the companies were found to be individually significant in Test 1. As an experiment, excluding the most extreme case-in which the price jumped 27 percent and the CAR reached 33 percent over the (-19, +3) event window-would reduce the "mean value" to insignificance. Third, the classification of close versus freeze has its own caveat. Some companies froze their DB plan benefit accrual to a subset of employees (e.g., nonunionized workers or those under a certain age or short of a certain number of service years), stopped pension credit for future years of work while allowing a benefit linked to future pay, or granted a benefit accrual for future years of service but locked it at the pay level as of the freeze date. Because many DB plan freezes are partial and determining whether these partial freezes would generate a stronger financial impact than closes is difficult, perhaps simply combining closes with freezes and conducting tests jointly, as in the benchmark tests, would be more sensible. Next, we extended the event window substantially by adding another 30 trading days before and/or after the announcements of freezes/closes. The extended window (-19, +50 ) is intended to acknowledge (unlikely) market inefficiency in the form of a delayed response of security prices to important information. The window (-49, +20) considers the possibility of news leaks long before the freeze/close announcements. The window (-49, +50) allows for both types of market inefficiency. Over these extended windows, some events emerge as statistically significant whereas others have lost their significance. An equal probability of upward and downward equity price movements seems to exist. We found no evidence that the market is slow in absorbing information. These findings indirectly support the market efficiency assumption and are in line with the fact that DB plan freezes/closes are widely covered by the press and financial analysts.
Finally, we divided our sample into two periods- 2003-2005 and 2006-2007- to examine the time pattern of the impact of DB freezes/ closes. We determined the split by the announcement dates, which assured an acceptable sample size for the two periods of 22 and 60 events, respectively. The results in Table 7 show that the insignificance of DB freezes/closes in moving equity prices, if not significantly negative, is not biased by when these events occurred.
Conclusion
Defined-benefit pension plans have declined in the past two decades because of a confluence of various factors. Among those factors, the portability of defined-contribution plans has appealed to more mobile workers whereas the seemingly lower cost of DC plans has induced some employers to follow their competitors and shift away from DB plans. In the meantime, DB plan-funding rules have been tightened and plan sponsors have been required to have more transparent reporting, both of which imply that the funding status of pension funds could add volatility to shareholders' equity and the balance sheet. In seeking to minimize the pension risk, rather than choose a drastic and costly termination of DB plans, many sponsors have chosen to freeze or close their plans in the hope that such an approach might give them time to adjust and increase corporate value.
Our study examined whether market-value increases have been observed in the form of security price movements surrounding the DB plan freeze/close events. For our analysis, we constructed a large database covering 82 publicly traded companies that froze or closed their DB pension plans in the 2003-07 period. Generally, those companies whose core businesses were economically cyclical were more likely than others to make such plan changes during the study period. Compared with industry peers that had left their DB plans intact, the companies adopting a freeze/ close appeared to have underperformed (but generally maintained positive growth) in the years leading up to the freeze/close events. On the basis of this extensive data sample, a set of parametric and nonparametric tests revealed little empirical evidence that stock prices changed significantly, especially in the upward direction, in the wake of an announced DB plan freeze/close. That is, freezing or closing DB pension plans appeared to have little impact on sponsoring companies' market value.
This finding defies the expectation that freezing a pension plan would deliver an immediate boost to the company's market value. Several factors may help explain the finding. First, whether the DB plan freeze/close would substantially cut corporate costs is unclear because employers often need to enhance the existing 401(k) plans in the benefits package in order to facilitate transition issues and workforce management. Second, any positive financial impact of the plan freeze/close may be outweighed by negative effects on employee morale, productivity, attraction, retention, and optimal retirement patterns. Third, the freeze/close events are often partial and gradual. Many companies sponsor multiple pension plans, have frozen/closed some plans while keeping others open, and have left the retirement benefits intact for many workers covered by the frozen/ closed plans (e.g., union members or those fulfilling requirements of age and/or service years). Finally, company management may have viewed DB freezes/closes as useful responses to short-term financial challenges, but the market appears to have been more cautious about the effects and implications of such DB plan events. for the switch would be about $24.5 million (Kabler 2008; Levitz 2008 ). 4. A full discussion of the methodology is in a technical appendix that is available from the authors upon request. 5. Two companies with identified announcement dates were not included in the 82-company sample because they were in Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 6. The discussion here is about regression results based on the (-19, +3) event window. Results based on the (-19, +20) window are similar. But those coefficients, significant here, cease to be significant for the event windows of (-1, +1) and (-3, +3) . Detailed regression results are available from the authors upon request.
